add torrent_info constructor overloads to control torrent file limits

ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+	* add torrent_info constructor overloads to control torrent file limits
 	* feature to disable DHT, PEX and LSD per torrent
 	* fix issue where trackers from magnet links were not included in create_torrent()
 	* make peer_info::client a byte array in python binding

examples/dump_torrent.cpp

@@ -58,40 +58,37 @@ std::vector<char> load_file(std::string const& filename)
 
 int main(int argc, char* argv[]) try
 {
-	if (argc < 2 || argc > 4) {
+	if (argc < 2 || argc > 5) {
-		std::cerr << "usage: dump_torrent torrent-file [total-items-limit] [recursion-limit]\n";
+		std::cerr << "usage: dump_torrent torrent-file [total-items-limit] [recursion-limit] [piece-count-limit]\n";
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-	int item_limit = 1000000;
+	lt::load_torrent_limits cfg;
-	int depth_limit = 1000;
 
-	if (argc > 2) item_limit = atoi(argv[2]);
+	if (argc > 2) cfg.max_decode_tokens = atoi(argv[2]);
-	if (argc > 3) depth_limit = atoi(argv[3]);
+	if (argc > 3) cfg.max_decode_depth = atoi(argv[3]);
+	if (argc > 4) cfg.max_pieces = atoi(argv[4]);
 
 	std::vector<char> buf = load_file(argv[1]);
-	lt::bdecode_node e;
 	int pos = -1;
 	lt::error_code ec;
-	std::cout << "decoding. recursion limit: " << depth_limit
+	std::cout << "decoding. recursion limit: " << cfg.max_decode_depth
-		<< " total item count limit: " << item_limit << "\n";
+		<< " total item count limit: " << cfg.max_decode_tokens << "\n";
-	int const ret = lt::bdecode(&buf[0], &buf[0] + buf.size(), e, ec, &pos
+	lt::bdecode_node const e = lt::bdecode(buf, ec, &pos, cfg.max_decode_depth
-		, depth_limit, item_limit);
+		, cfg.max_decode_tokens);
 
 	std::printf("\n\n----- raw info -----\n\n%s\n", print_entry(e).c_str());
 
-	if (ret != 0) {
+	if (ec) {
 		std::cerr << "failed to decode: '" << ec.message() << "' at character: " << pos<< "\n";
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-	lt::torrent_info const t(e);
+	lt::torrent_info const t(std::move(e), cfg);
-	e.clear();
+	buf.clear();
-	std::vector<char>().swap(buf);
 
 	// print info about torrent
-	std::printf("\n\n----- torrent file info -----\n\n"
+	std::printf("\n\n----- torrent file info -----\n\nnodes:\n");
-		"nodes:\n");
 	for (auto const& i : t.nodes())
 		std::printf("%s: %d\n", i.first.c_str(), i.second);
 

include/libtorrent/torrent_info.hpp

@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@ namespace libtorrent {
 	// used to disambiguate a bencoded buffer and a filename
 	extern TORRENT_EXPORT from_span_t from_span;
 
+	// this object holds configuration options for limits to use when loading
+	// torrents. They are meant to prevent loading potentially malicious torrents
+	// that cause excessive memory allocations.
+	struct load_torrent_limits
+	{
+		int max_buffer_size = 6000000;
+		// the max number of pieces allowed in the torrent
+		int max_pieces = 0x100000;
+		// the max recursion depth in the bdecoded structure
+		int max_decode_depth = 100;
+		// the max number of bdecode tokens
+		int max_decode_tokens = 2000000;
+	};
+
 	// TODO: there may be some opportunities to optimize the size if torrent_info.
 	// specifically to turn some std::string and std::vector into pointers
 	class TORRENT_EXPORT torrent_info
@@ -157,6 +171,9 @@ namespace libtorrent {
 			: torrent_info(span<char const>{buffer, size}, from_span) {}
 		explicit torrent_info(span<char const> buffer, from_span_t);
 		explicit torrent_info(std::string const& filename);
+		torrent_info(std::string const& filename, load_torrent_limits const& cfg);
+		torrent_info(span<char const> buffer, load_torrent_limits const& cfg, from_span_t);
+		torrent_info(bdecode_node const& torrent_file, load_torrent_limits const& cfg);
 #endif // BOOST_NO_EXCEPTIONS
 		torrent_info(torrent_info const& t);
 		explicit torrent_info(sha1_hash const& info_hash);
@@ -524,7 +541,11 @@ namespace libtorrent {
 		// where we only have the info-dict. The bdecode_node ``e`` points to a
 		// parsed info-dictionary. ``ec`` returns an error code if something
 		// fails (typically if the info dictionary is malformed).
+		// the `piece_limit` parameter allows limiting the amount of memory
+		// dedicated to loading the torrent, and fails for torrents that exceed
+		// the limit
 		bool parse_info_section(bdecode_node const& e, error_code& ec);
+		bool parse_info_section(bdecode_node const& e, error_code& ec, int piece_limit);
 
 		// This function looks up keys from the info-dictionary of the loaded
 		// torrent file. It can be used to access extension values put in the
@@ -551,11 +572,11 @@ namespace libtorrent {
 		// __ http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0030.html
 		bool is_merkle_torrent() const { return !m_merkle_tree.empty(); }
 
-		bool parse_torrent_file(bdecode_node const& libtorrent, error_code& ec);
-
-		// if we're logging member offsets, we need access to them
 	private:
 
+		bool parse_torrent_file(bdecode_node const& libtorrent, error_code& ec);
+		bool parse_torrent_file(bdecode_node const& libtorrent, error_code& ec, int piece_limit);
+
 		void resolve_duplicate_filenames();
 
 		// the slow path, in case we detect/suspect a name collision

src/torrent_info.cpp

@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ namespace libtorrent {
 
 	namespace {
 
+	// this is an arbitrary limit to avoid malicious torrents causing
+	// unreasaonably large allocations for the merkle hash tree
+	// the size of the tree would be max_pieces * sizeof(int) * 2
+	// which is about 8 MB with this limit
+	// TODO: remove this limit and the overloads that imply it, in favour of
+	// using load_torrent_limits
+	constexpr int default_piece_limit = 0x100000;
+
 	bool valid_path_character(std::int32_t const c)
 	{
 #ifdef TORRENT_WINDOWS
@@ -539,16 +547,21 @@ namespace {
 	}
 
 	int load_file(std::string const& filename, std::vector<char>& v
-		, error_code& ec)
+		, error_code& ec, int const max_buffer_size = 80000000)
 	{
 		ec.clear();
 		file f;
 		if (!f.open(filename, open_mode::read_only, ec)) return -1;
-		std::int64_t s = f.get_size(ec);
+		std::int64_t const s = f.get_size(ec);
 		if (ec) return -1;
+		if (s > max_buffer_size)
+		{
+			ec = errors::metadata_too_large;
+			return -1;
+		}
 		v.resize(std::size_t(s));
 		if (s == 0) return 0;
-		std::int64_t read = f.readv(0, {v}, ec);
+		std::int64_t const read = f.readv(0, {v}, ec);
 		if (read != s) return -3;
 		if (ec) return -3;
 		return 0;
@@ -869,6 +882,48 @@ namespace {
 		INVARIANT_CHECK;
 	}
 
+	torrent_info::torrent_info(bdecode_node const& torrent_file
+		, load_torrent_limits const& cfg)
+	{
+		error_code ec;
+		if (!parse_torrent_file(torrent_file, ec, cfg.max_pieces))
+			aux::throw_ex<system_error>(ec);
+
+		INVARIANT_CHECK;
+	}
+
+	torrent_info::torrent_info(span<char const> buffer
+		, load_torrent_limits const& cfg, from_span_t)
+	{
+		error_code ec;
+		bdecode_node e = bdecode(buffer, ec, nullptr
+			, cfg.max_decode_depth, cfg.max_decode_tokens);
+		if (ec) aux::throw_ex<system_error>(ec);
+
+		if (!parse_torrent_file(e, ec, cfg.max_pieces))
+			aux::throw_ex<system_error>(ec);
+
+		INVARIANT_CHECK;
+	}
+
+	torrent_info::torrent_info(std::string const& filename
+		, load_torrent_limits const& cfg)
+	{
+		std::vector<char> buf;
+		error_code ec;
+		int ret = load_file(filename, buf, ec, cfg.max_buffer_size);
+		if (ret < 0) aux::throw_ex<system_error>(ec);
+
+		bdecode_node e = bdecode(buf, ec, nullptr, cfg.max_decode_depth
+			, cfg.max_decode_tokens);
+		if (ec) aux::throw_ex<system_error>(ec);
+
+		if (!parse_torrent_file(e, ec, cfg.max_pieces))
+			aux::throw_ex<system_error>(ec);
+
+		INVARIANT_CHECK;
+	}
+
 #if TORRENT_ABI_VERSION == 1
 	torrent_info::torrent_info(std::wstring const& filename)
 	{
@@ -1004,8 +1059,13 @@ namespace {
 		return m_info_dict.dict_find_string_value("ssl-cert");
 	}
 
+	bool torrent_info::parse_info_section(bdecode_node const& e, error_code& ec)
+	{
+		return parse_info_section(e, ec, default_piece_limit);
+	}
+
 	bool torrent_info::parse_info_section(bdecode_node const& info
-		, error_code& ec)
+		, error_code& ec, int const max_pieces)
 	{
 		if (info.type() != bdecode_node::dict_t)
 		{
@@ -1129,12 +1189,6 @@ namespace {
 			return false;
 		}
 
-		// this is an arbitrary limit to avoid malicious torrents causing
-		// unreasaonably large allocations for the merkle hash tree
-		// the size of the tree would be max_pieces * sizeof(int) * 2
-		// which is about 6.3 MB with this limit
-		const int max_pieces = 0xC0000;
-
 		// we expect the piece hashes to be < 2 GB in size
 		if (files.num_pieces() >= std::numeric_limits<int>::max() / 20
 			|| files.num_pieces() > max_pieces)
@@ -1315,6 +1369,12 @@ namespace {
 
 	bool torrent_info::parse_torrent_file(bdecode_node const& torrent_file
 		, error_code& ec)
+	{
+		return parse_torrent_file(torrent_file, ec, default_piece_limit);
+	}
+
+	bool torrent_info::parse_torrent_file(bdecode_node const& torrent_file
+		, error_code& ec, int const piece_limit)
 	{
 		if (torrent_file.type() != bdecode_node::dict_t)
 		{
@@ -1342,7 +1402,7 @@ namespace {
 			ec = errors::torrent_missing_info;
 			return false;
 		}
-		if (!parse_info_section(info, ec)) return false;
+		if (!parse_info_section(info, ec, piece_limit)) return false;
 		resolve_duplicate_filenames();
 
 #ifndef TORRENT_DISABLE_MUTABLE_TORRENTS