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readme.md
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readme.md
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@ -15,16 +15,16 @@ as the [NSA](https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-mill
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###Overview
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**High end end-to-end encryption** with Curve25519 ECDHE / PSKs.
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**Strong end-to-end encryption** with Curve25519 ECDHE / PSKs.
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XSalsa20-Poly1305 AEAD with forward secrecy and deniability.
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**High entropy key generation** with /dev/urandom mixed with entropy from
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**Secure key generation** with /dev/urandom mixed with entropy from
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open circuit design GPIO HWRNG of RPi that acts either as TCB itself or as
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a sampling device over SSH.
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**Strong endpoint security** is obtained with hardware-based TCB separation:
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**Endpoint security** obtained with hardware-based TCB separation:
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Unidirectional data flow between end point's three computers prevents
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either injection of malware or exfiltration of keys and plaintexts from TCB
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regardless of existing software zero-day vulnerabilities in software.
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@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ to receiver computers (RxM) via networked computer (NH) through RS-232 interface
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and a data diode.
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Depending on packet type, the program NH.py running on Alice's NH forwards
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packets from TxM's serial interface to Pidgin and local RxM (through another
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packets from TxM-sode serial interface to Pidgin and local RxM (through another
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RS-232 interface and data diode). Local RxM authenticates and decrypts received
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data before processing it.
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@ -62,15 +62,14 @@ that then forwards it directly (or again through Tor) to Bob.
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NH.py on Bob's NH receives Alice's packet from Pidgin, and forwards it through
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RS-232 interface and data diode to Bob's RxM, where the ciphertext is
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authenticated, decrypted, displayed and optionally also logged. When the Bob
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responds, he will send the message using his TxM and in the end Alice reads the
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message from her RxM.
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authenticated, decrypted, and processed. When the Bob responds, he will send
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the message/file using his TxM and in the end Alice reads the message from her RxM.
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###Why keys can not be exfiltrated
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1. Malware that exploits an unknown vulnerability in RxM can infiltrate to
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system, but is unable to exfiltrate keys or plaintexts, as data diode prevents
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the system, but is unable to exfiltrate keys or plaintexts, as data diode prevents
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all outbound traffic.
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2. Malware can not breach TxM as data diode prevents all inbound traffic. The
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@ -81,11 +80,19 @@ user.
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![](https://cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/tfc_attacks2.png)
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The optical gap of the data diode (below) physically blocks back channels.
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Optical repeater inside the optocoupler of the data diode (below) enforces direction of data transmission.
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<img src="https://cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/data_diode.png" align="center" width="74%" height="74%"/>
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###Installation
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[![Installation](http://img.youtube.com/vi/D5pDoJZj2Uw/0.jpg)](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5pDoJZj2Uw)
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###How to use
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[![Use](http://img.youtube.com/vi/tH8qbl1USoo/0.jpg)](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tH8qbl1USoo)
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###More information
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White paper and manual for previous versions are listed below. TFC-NaCl specific
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