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============================================
BitTorrent extension for arbitrary DHT store
============================================
:Author: Arvid Norberg, arvid@rasterbar.com
:Version: 1.0.0
.. contents:: Table of contents
:depth: 2
:backlinks: none
This is a proposal for an extension to the BitTorrent DHT to allow
storing and retrieving of arbitrary data.
It supports both storing *immutable* items, where the key is
the SHA-1 hash of the data itself, and *mutable* items, where
the key is the public key of the key pair used to sign the data.
There are two new proposed messages, ``put`` and ``get``.
terminology
-----------
In this document, a *storage node* refers to the node in the DHT to which
an item is being announced and stored on. A *requesting node* refers to
a node which makes look-ups in the DHT to find the storage nodes, to
request items from them, and possibly re-announce those items to keep them
alive.
messages
--------
The proposed new messages ``get`` and ``put`` are similar to the existing ``get_peers``
and ``announce_peer``.
Responses to ``get`` should always include ``nodes`` and ``nodes6``. Those fields
have the same semantics as in its ``get_peers`` response. It should also include a write token,
``token``, with the same semantics as int ``get_peers``. The write token MAY be tied
specifically to the key which ``get`` requested. i.e. the ``token`` can only be used
to store values under that one key.
The ``id`` field in these messages has the same semantics as the standard DHT messages,
i.e. the node ID of the node sending the message, to maintain the structure of the DHT
network.
The ``token`` field also has the same semantics as the standard DHT message ``get_peers``
and ``announce_peer``, when requesting an item and to write an item respectively.
The ``k`` field is the 32 byte ed25519 public key, which the signature
can be authenticated with. When looking up a mutable item, the ``target`` field
MUST be the SHA-1 hash of this key.
The distinction between storing mutable and immutable items is the inclusion
of a public key, a sequence number and signature (``k``, ``seq`` and ``sig``).
``get`` requests for mutable items and immutable items cannot be distinguished from
eachother. An implementation can either store mutable and immutable items in the same
hash table internally, or in separate ones and potentially do two lookups for ``get``
requests.
The ``v`` field is the *value* to be stored. It is allowed to be any bencoded type (list,
dict, string or integer). When it's being hashed (for verifying its signature or to calculate
its key), its flattened, bencoded, form is used. It is important to use the exact
bencoded representation as it appeared in the message. decoding and then re-encoding
bencoded structures is not necessarily an identity operation.
Storing nodes SHOULD reject ``put`` requests where the bencoded form of ``v`` is longer
than 1000 bytes.
immutable items
---------------
Immutable items are stored under their SHA-1 hash, and since they cannot be modified,
there is no need to authenticate the origin of them. This makes immutable items simple.
A node making a lookup SHOULD verify the data it receives from the network, to verify
that its hash matches the target that was looked up.
put message
...........
Request:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"a":
{
"id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>*,
"v": *<any bencoded type, whose encoded size <= 1000>*
},
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "q",
"q": "put"
}
Response:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"r": { "id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>* },
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "r",
}
get message
...........
Request:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"a":
{
"id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>*,
"target": *<SHA-1 hash of item (string)>*,
},
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "q",
"q": "get"
}
Response:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"r":
{
"id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>*,
"token": *<write token (string)>*,
"v": *<any bencoded type whose SHA-1 hash matches 'target'>*,
"nodes": *<IPv4 nodes close to 'target'>*,
"nodes6": *<IPv6 nodes close to 'target'>*
},
"t": *<transaction-id>*,
"y": "r",
}
mutable items
-------------
Mutable items can be updated, without changing their DHT keys. To authenticate
that only the original publisher can update an item, it is signed by a private key
generated by the original publisher. The target ID mutable items are stored under
is the SHA-1 hash of the public key (as it appears in the ``put`` message).
In order to avoid a malicious node to overwrite the list head with an old
version, the sequence number ``seq`` must be monotonically increasing for each update,
and a node hosting the list node MUST not downgrade a list head from a higher sequence
number to a lower one, only upgrade. The sequence number SHOULD not exceed ``MAX_INT64``,
(i.e. ``0x7fffffffffffffff``. A client MAY reject any message with a sequence number
exceeding this.
The signature is a 64 byte ed25519 signature of the bencoded sequence
number concatenated with the ``v`` key. e.g. something like this:: ``3:seqi4e1:v12:Hello world!``.
put message
...........
Request:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"a":
{
"cas": *<optional 20 byte hash (string)>*,
"id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>*,
"k": *<ed25519 public key (32 bytes string)>*,
"seq": *<monotonically increasing sequence number (integer)>*,
"sig": *<ed25519 signature (64 bytes string)>*,
"token": *<write-token (string)>*,
"v": *<any bencoded type, whose encoded size < 1000>*
},
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "q",
"q": "put"
}
Storing nodes receiving a ``put`` request where ``seq`` is lower than or equal
to what's already stored on the node, MUST reject the request. If the sequence
number is equal, and the value is also the same, the node SHOULD reset its timeout
counter.
If the sequence number in the ``put`` message is lower than the sequence number
associated with the currently stored value, the storing node MAY return an error
message with code 302 (see error codes below).
Note that this request does not contain a target hash. The target hash under
which this blob is stored is implied by the ``k`` argument. The key is
the SHA-1 hash of the key (``k``).
The ``cas`` field is optional. If present it is interpreted of the sha-1 hash of
the sequence number and ``v`` field that is expected to be replaced. The buffer
to hash is the same as the one signed when storing. ``cas`` is short for *compare
and swap*, it has similar semantics as CAS CPU instructions. If specified as part
of the put command, and the current value stored under the public key differs from
the expected value, the store fails. The ``cas`` field only applies to mutable puts.
Response:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"r": { "id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>* },
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "r",
}
If the store fails for any reason an error message is returned instead of the message
template above, i.e. one where "y" is "e" and "e" is a tuple of [error-code, message]).
Failures include where the ``cas`` hash mismatches and the sequence number is outdated.
If no ``cas`` field is included in the ``put`` message, the value of the current ``v``
field should be disregarded when determining whether or not to save the item.
The error message (as specified by BEP5_) looks like this:
.. _BEP5: http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0005.html
.. parsed-literal::
{
"e": [ *<error-code (integer)>*, *<error-string (string)>* ],
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "e",
}
In addition to the error codes defined in BEP5_, this specification defines
some additional error codes.
+------------+-----------------------------+
| error-code | description |
+============+=============================+
| 205 | message (i.e. ``v`` field) |
| | too big. |
+------------+-----------------------------+
| 206 | invalid signature |
+------------+-----------------------------+
| 301 | the CAS hash mismatched, |
| | re-read value and try |
| | again. |
+------------+-----------------------------+
| 302 | sequence number less than |
| | current. |
+------------+-----------------------------+
An implementation MUST emit 301 errors if the cas-hash mismatches. This is
a critical feature in synchronization of multiple agents sharing an immutable item.
get message
...........
Request:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"a":
{
"id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>*,
"target:" *<20 byte SHA-1 hash of public key (string)>*
},
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "q",
"q": "get"
}
Response:
.. parsed-literal::
{
"r":
{
"id": *<20 byte id of sending node (string)>*,
"k": *<ed25519 public key (32 bytes string)>*,
"nodes": *<IPv4 nodes close to 'target'>*,
"nodes6": *<IPv6 nodes close to 'target'>*,
"seq": *<monotonically increasing sequence number (integer)>*,
"sig": *<ed25519 signature (64 bytes string)>*,
"token": *<write-token (string)>*,
"v": *<any bencoded type, whose encoded size <= 1000>*
},
"t": *<transaction-id (string)>*,
"y": "r",
}
signature verification
----------------------
The signature, private and public keys are in the format as produced by this derivative `ed25519 library`_.
.. _`ed25519 library`: https://github.com/nightcracker/ed25519
In order to make it maximally difficult to attack the bencoding parser, signing and verification of the
value and sequence number should be done as follows:
1. encode value and sequence number separately
2. concatenate *"3:seqi"* ``seq`` *"e1:v"* ``len`` *":"* and the encoded value.
sequence number 1 of value "Hello World!" would be converted to: "3:seqi1e1:v12:Hello World!"
In this way it is not possible to convince a node that part of the length is actually part of the
sequence number even if the parser contains certain bugs. Furthermore it is not possible to have a
verification failure if a bencoding serializer alters the order of entries in the dictionary.
3. sign or verify the concatenated string
On the storage node, the signature MUST be verified before accepting the store command. The data
MUST be stored under the SHA-1 hash of the public key (as it appears in the bencoded dict).
On the requesting nodes, the key they get back from a ``get`` request MUST be verified to hash
to the target ID the lookup was made for, as well as verifying the signature. If any of these fail,
the response SHOULD be considered invalid.
expiration
----------
Without re-announcement, these items MAY expire in 2 hours. In order
to keep items alive, they SHOULD be re-announced once an hour.
Any node that's interested in keeping a blob in the DHT alive may announce it. It would simply
repeat the signature for a mutable put without having the private key.
test vectors
------------
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