first implementation of DHT security implementation. tie the node ID to the external IP
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Arvid Norberg
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@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
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<h1><span>Rasterbar Software</span></h1>
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<h2><span>Software developement and consulting</span></h2>
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</div>
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<div id="main">
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<h1 class="title">BitTorrent DHT security extension</h1>
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<table class="docinfo" frame="void" rules="none">
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<col class="docinfo-name" />
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<col class="docinfo-content" />
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<tbody valign="top">
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<tr><th class="docinfo-name">Author:</th>
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<td>Arvid Norberg, <a class="last reference external" href="mailto:arvid@rasterbar.com">arvid@rasterbar.com</a></td></tr>
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<tr><th class="docinfo-name">Version:</th>
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<td>Draft</td></tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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<div class="contents topic" id="table-of-contents">
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<p class="topic-title first">Table of contents</p>
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<ul class="simple">
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<li><a class="reference internal" href="#id1" id="id2">BitTorrent DHT security extension</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference internal" href="#node-ids" id="id3">node IDs</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference internal" href="#bootstrapping" id="id4">bootstrapping</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference internal" href="#enforcement" id="id5">enforcement</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference internal" href="#backwards-compatibility-and-transition" id="id6">backwards compatibility and transition</a></li>
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</ul>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="id1">
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<h1>BitTorrent DHT security extension</h1>
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<p>The purpose of this extension is to make it harder to launch a few
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specific attacks against the BitTorrent DHT and also to make it harder
|
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to snoop the network.</p>
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<p>Specifically the attack this extension intends to make harder is launching
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8 or more DHT nodes which node-IDs selected close to a specific target
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info-hash, in order to become the main nodes hosting peers for it. Currently
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this is very easy to do and lets the attacker not only see all the traffic
|
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related to this specific info-hash but also block access to it by other
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peers.</p>
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<p>The proposed guard against this is to enforce restrictions on which node-ID
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a node can choose, based on its external IP address.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="node-ids">
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<h1>node IDs</h1>
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<p>The proposed formula for restricting node IDs is that the 4 first bytes of
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the node ID MUST match the 4 first bytes of <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">SHA-1(IP_address)</span></tt>. That is,
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the raw, big endian, storage of the address, either IPv4 or IPv6, hashed
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with SHA-1.</p>
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<p>Example:</p>
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<blockquote>
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An IP address 89.5.5.5 has a big endian byte representation of
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<tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">0x59</span> <span class="pre">0x05</span> <span class="pre">0x05</span> <span class="pre">0x05</span></tt>. The SHA-1 hash of this byte sequence is
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<tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">656d41da810a0a6d92fd2f6a8ba3b466e35ab368</span></tt>. The DHT node must choose
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a node ID which starts with <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">656d41da</span></tt>.</blockquote>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="bootstrapping">
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<h1>bootstrapping</h1>
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<p>In order to set ones initial node ID, the external IP needs to be known. This
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is not a trivial problem. WIth this extension, <em>all</em> DHT requests whose node
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ID does not match its IP address MUST be serviced and MUST also include one
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extra result value (inside the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">r</span></tt> dictionary) called <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">ip</span></tt>. The IP field
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contains the raw (big endian) byte representation of the external IP address.
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This is the same byte sequence passed to SHA-1.</p>
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<p>A DHT node which receives an <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">ip</span></tt> result in a request SHOULD consider restarting
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its DHT node with a new node ID, taking this IP into account. Since a single node
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can not be trusted, there should be some mechanism of determining whether or
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not the node has a correct understanding of its external IP or not. This could
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be done by voting, or only restart the DHT once at least a certain number of
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nodes, from separate searches, tells you your node ID is incorrect.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="enforcement">
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<h1>enforcement</h1>
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<p>Write tokens from peers whose node ID does not match its external IP should be
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considered dropped. In other words, a peer that uses a non-matching ID MUST
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never be used to store information on, regardless of which request. In the
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original DHT specification only <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">announce_peer</span></tt> stores data in the network,
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but any future extension which stores data in the network SHOULD use the same
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restriction.</p>
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<p>Any peer on a local network address is exempt from this node ID verification.
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This includes the following IP blocks:</p>
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<dl class="docutils">
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<dt>10.0.0.0/8</dt>
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<dd>reserved for local networks</dd>
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<dt>172.16.0.0/12</dt>
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<dd>reserved for local networks</dd>
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<dt>192.168.0.0/16</dt>
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<dd>reserved for local networks</dd>
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<dt>169.254.0.0/16</dt>
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<dd>reserved for self-assigned IPs</dd>
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<dt>127.0.0.0/8</dt>
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<dd>reserved for loopback</dd>
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</dl>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="backwards-compatibility-and-transition">
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<h1>backwards compatibility and transition</h1>
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<p>During some transition period, this restriction should not be enforced, and
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peers whose node ID does not match this formula relative to their external IP
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should not be blocked.</p>
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<p>Requests from peers whose node ID does not match their external IP should
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always be serviced, even after the transition period. The attack this protects
|
||||
from is storing data on an attacker's node, not servicing an attackers request.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div id="footer">
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||||
<span>Copyright © 2005 Rasterbar Software.</span>
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</div>
|
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</div>
|
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<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript">
|
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</script>
|
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<script type="text/javascript">
|
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_uacct = "UA-1599045-1";
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||||
urchinTracker();
|
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</script>
|
||||
</div>
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</body>
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</html>
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@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
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=================================
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BitTorrent DHT security extension
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=================================
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:Author: Arvid Norberg, arvid@rasterbar.com
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:Version: Draft
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.. contents:: Table of contents
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:depth: 2
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:backlinks: none
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BitTorrent DHT security extension
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---------------------------------
|
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|
||||
The purpose of this extension is to make it harder to launch a few
|
||||
specific attacks against the BitTorrent DHT and also to make it harder
|
||||
to snoop the network.
|
||||
|
||||
Specifically the attack this extension intends to make harder is launching
|
||||
8 or more DHT nodes which node-IDs selected close to a specific target
|
||||
info-hash, in order to become the main nodes hosting peers for it. Currently
|
||||
this is very easy to do and lets the attacker not only see all the traffic
|
||||
related to this specific info-hash but also block access to it by other
|
||||
peers.
|
||||
|
||||
The proposed guard against this is to enforce restrictions on which node-ID
|
||||
a node can choose, based on its external IP address.
|
||||
|
||||
node IDs
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--------
|
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|
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The proposed formula for restricting node IDs is that the 4 first bytes of
|
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the node ID MUST match the 4 first bytes of ``SHA-1(IP_address)``. That is,
|
||||
the raw, big endian, storage of the address, either IPv4 or IPv6, hashed
|
||||
with SHA-1.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
An IP address 89.5.5.5 has a big endian byte representation of
|
||||
``0x59 0x05 0x05 0x05``. The SHA-1 hash of this byte sequence is
|
||||
``656d41da810a0a6d92fd2f6a8ba3b466e35ab368``. The DHT node must choose
|
||||
a node ID which starts with ``656d41da``.
|
||||
|
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bootstrapping
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-------------
|
||||
|
||||
In order to set ones initial node ID, the external IP needs to be known. This
|
||||
is not a trivial problem. WIth this extension, *all* DHT requests whose node
|
||||
ID does not match its IP address MUST be serviced and MUST also include one
|
||||
extra result value (inside the ``r`` dictionary) called ``ip``. The IP field
|
||||
contains the raw (big endian) byte representation of the external IP address.
|
||||
This is the same byte sequence passed to SHA-1.
|
||||
|
||||
A DHT node which receives an ``ip`` result in a request SHOULD consider restarting
|
||||
its DHT node with a new node ID, taking this IP into account. Since a single node
|
||||
can not be trusted, there should be some mechanism of determining whether or
|
||||
not the node has a correct understanding of its external IP or not. This could
|
||||
be done by voting, or only restart the DHT once at least a certain number of
|
||||
nodes, from separate searches, tells you your node ID is incorrect.
|
||||
|
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enforcement
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-----------
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|
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Write tokens from peers whose node ID does not match its external IP should be
|
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considered dropped. In other words, a peer that uses a non-matching ID MUST
|
||||
never be used to store information on, regardless of which request. In the
|
||||
original DHT specification only ``announce_peer`` stores data in the network,
|
||||
but any future extension which stores data in the network SHOULD use the same
|
||||
restriction.
|
||||
|
||||
Any peer on a local network address is exempt from this node ID verification.
|
||||
This includes the following IP blocks:
|
||||
|
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10.0.0.0/8
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reserved for local networks
|
||||
172.16.0.0/12
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reserved for local networks
|
||||
192.168.0.0/16
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reserved for local networks
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169.254.0.0/16
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reserved for self-assigned IPs
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127.0.0.0/8
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reserved for loopback
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backwards compatibility and transition
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--------------------------------------
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During some transition period, this restriction should not be enforced, and
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peers whose node ID does not match this formula relative to their external IP
|
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should not be blocked.
|
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|
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Requests from peers whose node ID does not match their external IP should
|
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always be serviced, even after the transition period. The attack this protects
|
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from is storing data on an attacker's node, not servicing an attackers request.
|
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@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
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<li><a class="reference external" href="extension_protocol.html">extensions protocol</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference external" href="libtorrent_plugins.html">plugin interface</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference external" href="dht_extensions.html">DHT extensions</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference external" href="dht_sec.html">DHT security extension</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference external" href="udp_tracker_protocol.html">UDP tracker protocol</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference external" href="http://www.getright.com/seedtorrent.html">HTTP seed</a></li>
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<li><a class="reference external" href="http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0012.html">multitracker</a></li>
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|
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@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Extensions
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* `extensions protocol`_
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* `plugin interface`_
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* `DHT extensions`_
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* `DHT security extension`_
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* `UDP tracker protocol`_
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* `HTTP seed`_
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* multitracker_
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@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ libtorrent
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.. _`extensions protocol`: extension_protocol.html
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.. _`plugin interface`: libtorrent_plugins.html
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.. _`DHT extensions`: dht_extensions.html
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.. _`DHT security extension`: dht_sec.html
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.. _`UDP tracker protocol`: udp_tracker_protocol.html
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.. _`HTTP seed`: http://www.getright.com/seedtorrent.html
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.. _multitracker: http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0012.html
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|
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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ TARGETS = index \
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extension_protocol \
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make_torrent \
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dht_extensions \
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dht_sec \
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libtorrent_plugins \
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python_binding \
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projects \
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|
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@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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#include "libtorrent/config.hpp"
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#include "libtorrent/peer_id.hpp"
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#include "libtorrent/assert.hpp"
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#include "libtorrent/address.hpp"
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namespace libtorrent { namespace dht
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{
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@ -55,7 +56,9 @@ bool TORRENT_EXPORT compare_ref(node_id const& n1, node_id const& n2, node_id co
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// usefult for finding out which bucket a node belongs to
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int TORRENT_EXPORT distance_exp(node_id const& n1, node_id const& n2);
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node_id TORRENT_EXPORT generate_id();
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node_id TORRENT_EXPORT generate_id(address const& external_ip = address());
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bool TORRENT_EXPORT verify_id(node_id const& nid, address const& source_ip);
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} } // namespace libtorrent::dht
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|
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@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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#include "libtorrent/ptime.hpp"
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namespace libtorrent { namespace aux { struct session_impl; } }
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namespace libtorrent { namespace dht
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{
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@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ public:
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rpc_manager(node_id const& our_id
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, routing_table& table, send_fun const& sf
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, void* userdata);
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, void* userdata, aux::session_impl& ses);
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~rpc_manager();
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void unreachable(udp::endpoint const& ep);
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@ -116,6 +118,7 @@ private:
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node_id m_random_number;
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int m_allocated_observers;
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bool m_destructing;
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aux::session_impl& m_ses;
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};
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} } // namespace libtorrent::dht
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|
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@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ namespace libtorrent
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TORRENT_EXPORT std::string print_address(address const& addr);
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TORRENT_EXPORT std::string print_endpoint(tcp::endpoint const& ep);
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TORRENT_EXPORT std::string print_endpoint(udp::endpoint const& ep);
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TORRENT_EXPORT std::string address_to_bytes(address const& a);
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namespace detail
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{
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|
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@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ namespace libtorrent
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return ((ip & 0xff000000) == 0x0a000000 // 10.x.x.x
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|| (ip & 0xfff00000) == 0xac100000 // 172.16.x.x
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|| (ip & 0xffff0000) == 0xc0a80000 // 192.168.x.x
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|| (ip & 0xffff0000) == 0xa9fe0000); // 169.254.x.x
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|| (ip & 0xffff0000) == 0xa9fe0000 // 169.254.x.x
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|| (ip & 0xff000000) == 0x7f000000); // 127.x.x.x
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}
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bool is_loopback(address const& addr)
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|
|
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@ -183,9 +183,9 @@ node_impl::node_impl(libtorrent::aux::session_impl& ses
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, node_id nid
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, void* userdata)
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: m_settings(settings)
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, m_id(nid == (node_id::min)() ? generate_id() : nid)
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, m_id(nid == (node_id::min)() || !verify_id(nid, ses.external_address()) ? generate_id(ses.external_address()) : nid)
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, m_table(m_id, 8, settings)
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, m_rpc(m_id, m_table, f, userdata)
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, m_rpc(m_id, m_table, f, userdata, ses)
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, m_last_tracker_tick(time_now())
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, m_ses(ses)
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, m_send(f)
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@ -702,6 +702,11 @@ void node_impl::incoming_request(msg const& m, entry& e)
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entry& reply = e["r"];
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m_rpc.add_our_id(reply);
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// if this nodes ID doesn't match its IP, tell it what
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// its IP is
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if (!verify_id(id, m.addr.address()))
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reply["ip"] = address_to_bytes(m.addr.address());
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if (strcmp(query, "ping") == 0)
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{
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// we already have 't' and 'id' in the response
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@ -848,6 +853,7 @@ void node_impl::incoming_request(msg const& m, entry& e)
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++g_announces;
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#endif
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}
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/*
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else if (strcmp(query, "find_torrent") == 0)
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{
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key_desc_t msg_desc[] = {
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|
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@ -921,6 +927,7 @@ void node_impl::incoming_request(msg const& m, entry& e)
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i->second.publish(msg_keys[2]->string_value(), in_tags, num_tags);
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||||
}
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*/
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else
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{
|
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// if we don't recognize the message but there's a
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|
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|
|||
|
|
@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|||
#include "libtorrent/kademlia/node_id.hpp"
|
||||
#include "libtorrent/hasher.hpp"
|
||||
#include "libtorrent/assert.hpp"
|
||||
#include "libtorrent/broadcast_socket.hpp" // for is_local et.al
|
||||
|
||||
namespace libtorrent { namespace dht
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
@ -94,19 +95,52 @@ int distance_exp(node_id const& n1, node_id const& n2)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct static_ { static_() { std::srand(std::time(0)); } } static__;
|
||||
|
||||
node_id generate_id()
|
||||
|
||||
void hash_address(address const& ip, sha1_hash& h)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ip.is_v4())
|
||||
{
|
||||
address_v4::bytes_type b = ip.to_v4().to_bytes();
|
||||
h = hasher((char*)&b[0], b.size()).final();
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
address_v6::bytes_type b = ip.to_v6().to_bytes();
|
||||
h = hasher((char*)&b[0], b.size()).final();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// verifies whether a node-id matches the IP it's used from
|
||||
// returns true if the node-id is OK coming from this source
|
||||
// and false otherwise.
|
||||
bool verify_id(node_id const& nid, address const& source_ip)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// no need to verify local IPs, they would be incorrect anyway
|
||||
if (is_local(source_ip)) return true;
|
||||
|
||||
node_id h;
|
||||
hash_address(source_ip, h);
|
||||
return memcmp(&nid[0], &h[0], 4) == 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
node_id generate_id(address const& external_ip)
|
||||
{
|
||||
node_id h;
|
||||
char random[20];
|
||||
#ifdef _MSC_VER
|
||||
std::generate(random, random + 20, &rand);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
std::generate(random, random + 20, &std::rand);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
h = hasher(random, 20).final();
|
||||
|
||||
hasher h;
|
||||
h.update(random, 20);
|
||||
return h.final();
|
||||
if (!is_local(external_ip))
|
||||
{
|
||||
node_id ph;
|
||||
hash_address(external_ip, ph);
|
||||
memcpy(&h[0], &ph[0], 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return h;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} } // namespace libtorrent::dht
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ bool routing_table::need_refresh(node_id& target) const
|
|||
if (time_now() - i->last_active < minutes(15)) return false;
|
||||
|
||||
// generate a random node_id within the given bucket
|
||||
target = generate_id();
|
||||
target = generate_id(address());
|
||||
int num_bits = std::distance(m_buckets.begin(), i) + 1;
|
||||
node_id mask(0);
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < num_bits; ++i) mask[i/8] |= 0x80 >> (i&7);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -33,10 +33,14 @@ POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|||
#include "libtorrent/pch.hpp"
|
||||
#include "libtorrent/socket.hpp"
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: it would be nice to not have this dependency here
|
||||
#include "libtorrent/aux_/session_impl.hpp"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <boost/bind.hpp>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <libtorrent/io.hpp>
|
||||
#include <libtorrent/invariant_check.hpp>
|
||||
#include <libtorrent/kademlia/node_id.hpp> // for generate_id
|
||||
#include <libtorrent/kademlia/rpc_manager.hpp>
|
||||
#include <libtorrent/kademlia/logging.hpp>
|
||||
#include <libtorrent/kademlia/routing_table.hpp>
|
||||
|
|
@ -150,8 +154,6 @@ void observer::timeout()
|
|||
m_algorithm->failed(observer_ptr(this));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
node_id generate_id();
|
||||
|
||||
enum { observer_size = max3<
|
||||
sizeof(find_data_observer)
|
||||
, sizeof(announce_observer)
|
||||
|
|
@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ enum { observer_size = max3<
|
|||
|
||||
rpc_manager::rpc_manager(node_id const& our_id
|
||||
, routing_table& table, send_fun const& sf
|
||||
, void* userdata)
|
||||
, void* userdata, aux::session_impl& ses)
|
||||
: m_pool_allocator(observer_size, 10)
|
||||
, m_next_transaction_id(std::rand() % max_transaction_id)
|
||||
, m_send(sf)
|
||||
|
|
@ -172,6 +174,7 @@ rpc_manager::rpc_manager(node_id const& our_id
|
|||
, m_random_number(generate_id())
|
||||
, m_allocated_observers(0)
|
||||
, m_destructing(false)
|
||||
, m_ses(ses)
|
||||
{
|
||||
std::srand(time(0));
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -339,6 +342,22 @@ bool rpc_manager::incoming(msg const& m, node_id* id)
|
|||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lazy_entry const* ext_ip = ret_ent->dict_find_string("ip");
|
||||
if (ext_ip && ext_ip->string_length() == 4)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// this node claims we use the wrong node-ID!
|
||||
address_v4::bytes_type b;
|
||||
memcpy(&b[0], ext_ip->string_ptr(), 4);
|
||||
m_ses.set_external_address(address_v4(b));
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (ext_ip && ext_ip->string_length() == 16)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// this node claims we use the wrong node-ID!
|
||||
address_v6::bytes_type b;
|
||||
memcpy(&b[0], ext_ip->string_ptr(), 16);
|
||||
m_ses.set_external_address(address_v6(b));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef TORRENT_DHT_VERBOSE_LOGGING
|
||||
TORRENT_LOG(rpc) << "[" << o->m_algorithm.get() << "] Reply with transaction id: "
|
||||
<< tid << " from " << m.addr;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4353,6 +4353,12 @@ namespace aux {
|
|||
m_external_address = ip;
|
||||
if (m_alerts.should_post<external_ip_alert>())
|
||||
m_alerts.post_alert(external_ip_alert(ip));
|
||||
|
||||
// since we have a new external IP now, we need to
|
||||
// restart the DHT with a new node ID
|
||||
#ifndef TORRENT_DISABLE_DHT
|
||||
start_dht(m_dht_state);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void session_impl::free_disk_buffer(char* buf)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -47,6 +47,20 @@ namespace libtorrent
|
|||
return addr.to_string(ec);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
std::string address_to_bytes(address const& a)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (a.is_v4())
|
||||
{
|
||||
address_v4::bytes_type b = a.to_v4().to_bytes();
|
||||
return std::string((char*)&b[0], b.size());
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
address_v6::bytes_type b = a.to_v6().to_bytes();
|
||||
return std::string((char*)&b[0], b.size());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
std::string print_endpoint(tcp::endpoint const& ep)
|
||||
{
|
||||
error_code ec;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue