Avoid overflow in COLR bounds checks.
The values read into `base_glyphs_offset_v1` and `layer_offset_v1` may be in the range 0xFFFFFFFD-0xFFFFFFFF. On systems where `unsigned long` is 32 bits adding 4 to such values will wrap and pass bounds checks but accessing values at such offsets will be out of bounds. On the other hand `table_size` has already been tested to be at least `COLRV1_HEADER_SIZE` (34) so it is safe to subtract 4 from it. * src/sfnt/ttcolr.c (tt_face_load_colr): subtract 4 from `table_size` instead of adding 4 to font data offsets in bounds checks Fixes: https://crbug.com/1469348
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@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
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base_glyphs_offset_v1 = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
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if ( base_glyphs_offset_v1 + 4 >= table_size )
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if ( base_glyphs_offset_v1 >= table_size - 4 )
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goto InvalidTable;
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p1 = (FT_Byte*)( table + base_glyphs_offset_v1 );
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@ -249,7 +249,7 @@
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if ( layer_offset_v1 )
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{
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if ( layer_offset_v1 + 4 >= table_size )
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if ( layer_offset_v1 >= table_size - 4 )
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goto InvalidTable;
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p1 = (FT_Byte*)( table + layer_offset_v1 );
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