/* * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. * * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU * Lesser General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA * */ #include #define NONAMELESSUNION #include "windef.h" #include "winbase.h" #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS #include "wincrypt.h" #include "wine/debug.h" #include "wine/unicode.h" #include "crypt32_private.h" WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt); WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain); #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine; /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used. * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement * CTLs or complex certificate chains. */ typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine { LONG ref; HCERTSTORE hRoot; HCERTSTORE hWorld; DWORD dwFlags; DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout; DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates; DWORD CycleDetectionModulus; } CertificateChainEngine, *PCertificateChainEngine; static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection, DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores) { DWORD i; for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++) CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0); } static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores) { DWORD i; for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++) CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0); } static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 }; /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */ static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL; BYTE hash[20]; DWORD size = sizeof(hash); if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size)) { CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash }; matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL); } return matching; } static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store) { BOOL ret = TRUE; if (store) { HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW); PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check; do { cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert); if (cert) { if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert))) ret = FALSE; else CertFreeCertificateContext(check); } } while (ret && cert); if (cert) CertFreeCertificateContext(cert); CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0); } return ret; } HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root, PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig) { static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 }; static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 }; static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 }; PCertificateChainEngine engine = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine)); if (engine) { HCERTSTORE worldStores[4]; engine->ref = 1; engine->hRoot = root; engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0, CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL); worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot); worldStores[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW); worldStores[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW); worldStores[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW); CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld, sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores); CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld, pConfig->cAdditionalStore, pConfig->rghAdditionalStore); CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores); engine->dwFlags = pConfig->dwFlags; engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = pConfig->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout; engine->MaximumCachedCertificates = pConfig->MaximumCachedCertificates; if (pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus) engine->CycleDetectionModulus = pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus; else engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS; } return engine; } BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig, HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine) { BOOL ret; TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine); if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(*pConfig)) { SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG); return FALSE; } *phChainEngine = NULL; ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot); if (ret) { HCERTSTORE root; HCERTCHAINENGINE engine; if (pConfig->hRestrictedRoot) root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot); else root = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW); engine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root, pConfig); if (engine) { *phChainEngine = engine; ret = TRUE; } else ret = FALSE; } return ret; } VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine) { PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine; TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine); if (engine && InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref) == 0) { CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0); CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0); CryptMemFree(engine); } } static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void) { if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine) { CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { 0 }; HCERTCHAINENGINE engine; config.cbSize = sizeof(config); CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config, &engine); InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine, engine, NULL); if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine != engine) CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine); } return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine; } void default_chain_engine_free(void) { CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine); } typedef struct _CertificateChain { CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context; HCERTSTORE world; LONG ref; } CertificateChain, *PCertificateChain; static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { PCERT_EXTENSION ext; DWORD size; BOOL ret; if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension))) { CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info; ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info, &size); if (ret) { if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry && info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData) { PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL; DWORD i; for (i = 0; !directoryName && i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++) if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME) directoryName = &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i]; if (directoryName) { ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType, &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) && CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber, &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber); } else { FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n"); ret = FALSE; } } else if (info->KeyId.cbData) { ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size); if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData) { LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size); if (buf) { CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size); ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size); CryptMemFree(buf); } } else ret = FALSE; } LocalFree(info); } } else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension))) { CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info; ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info, &size); if (ret) { if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData) { ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType, &info->CertIssuer, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) && CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->CertSerialNumber, &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber); } else if (info->KeyId.cbData) { ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size); if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData) { LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size); if (buf) { CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size); ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size); CryptMemFree(buf); } else ret = FALSE; } else ret = FALSE; } else ret = FALSE; LocalFree(info); } } else ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType, &cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer); return ret; } static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element) { CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext); CryptMemFree(element); } static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain) { DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0; /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */ for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++) for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++) if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)) cyclicCertIndex = j; if (cyclicCertIndex) { chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; /* Release remaining certs */ for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++) CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]); /* Truncate chain */ chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1; } } /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */ static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain) { if (chain->cElement) return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC; else return FALSE; } static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus, const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus) { /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */ chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus; /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the * chain. */ chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0); } static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus) { BOOL ret = FALSE; PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT)); if (element) { if (!chain->cElement) chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT)); else chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement, (chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT)); if (chain->rgpElement) { chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element; memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT)); element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT); element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert); if (chain->cElement > 1) chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus = subjectInfoStatus; /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */ if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus)) { CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain); /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated. */ element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]; } CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &element->TrustStatus); ret = TRUE; } else CryptMemFree(element); } return ret; } static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain) { DWORD i; for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++) CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]); CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement); CryptMemFree(chain); } static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot, PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement) { PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot, rootElement->pCertContext); if (!trustedRoot) rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT; else CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot); } static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot, PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement) { PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext; if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType, CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root, CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL)) { TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n"); rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID; } CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement); } /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified. * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded. */ static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified) { BOOL ret = TRUE; PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE; if (ext) { CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info; DWORD size = 0; ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &info, &size); if (ret) { if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1) constraints->fCA = info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG; LocalFree(info); } } else { ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); if (ext) { DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO); ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, 0, NULL, constraints, &size); } else constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified; } return ret; } /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.) * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise. * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue * the next certificate in the chain. * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if: * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation * occurs. * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining * chain is valid. */ static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints, DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated) { BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE; CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints; if (isRoot) implicitCA = TRUE; else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 || cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2) { BYTE hash[20]; DWORD size = sizeof(hash); if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size)) { CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash }; PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore( engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL); if (localCert) { CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert); implicitCA = TRUE; } } } if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert, &constraints, implicitCA))) { chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA; if (!constraints.fCA) { TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1); validBasicConstraints = FALSE; } else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint) { /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the * entire remaining chain. */ if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint || constraints.dwPathLenConstraint < chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint) { TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n", chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint); chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE; chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint = constraints.dwPathLenConstraint; } } } if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint && remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint) { TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n", remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint); validBasicConstraints = FALSE; *pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE; } return validBasicConstraints; } static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name) { BOOL match; /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name... * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host." * and for email addresses, * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)." */ if (constraint[0] == '.') { /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */ if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint)) match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint), constraint); else { /* name is too short, no match */ match = FALSE; } } else match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint); return match; } static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { BOOL match = FALSE; TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name)); if (!constraint) *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS; else if (!name) ; /* no match */ else { LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL; /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */ WCHAR hostname_buf[255]; /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From * section 4.2.1.10: * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name * and MAY specify a host or a domain." * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396. * * First, remove any scheme that's present. */ colon = strchrW(name, ':'); if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/') name = colon + 3; /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port. * Those are removed next.) */ authority_end = strchrW(name, '/'); if (!authority_end) authority_end = strchrW(name, '?'); if (!authority_end) authority_end = name + strlenW(name); /* Remove any port number from the authority. The userinfo portion * of an authority may contain a colon, so stop if a userinfo portion * is found (indicated by '@'). */ for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':' && *colon != '@'; colon--) ; if (*colon == ':') authority_end = colon; /* Remove any username from the authority */ if ((at = strchrW(name, '@'))) name = at; /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */ if (*authority_end) { if (authority_end - name < sizeof(hostname_buf) / sizeof(hostname_buf[0])) { memcpy(hostname_buf, name, (authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR)); hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0; hostname = hostname_buf; } /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */ } else hostname = name; if (hostname) match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname); } return match; } static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { BOOL match = FALSE; LPCWSTR at; TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name)); if (!constraint) *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS; else if (!name) ; /* no match */ else if (strchrW(constraint, '@')) match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name); else { if ((at = strchrW(name, '@'))) match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1); else match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name); } return match; } static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { BOOL match = FALSE; TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name)); if (!constraint) *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS; else if (!name) ; /* no match */ /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example, * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com * would not." */ else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint)) match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint); else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint)) { match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint), constraint); if (match) { BOOL dot = FALSE; LPCWSTR ptr; /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e. * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the * matching portion of the name. */ for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint); !dot && ptr >= name; ptr--) if (*ptr == '.') dot = TRUE; match = dot; } } /* else: name is too short, no match */ return match; } static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint, const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { BOOL match = FALSE; TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData, name->cbData, name->pbData); /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively. */ if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32) *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS; else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) && constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2) { DWORD subnet, mask, addr; memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet)); memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask)); memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr)); /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we * don't need to swap to host order */ match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask); } else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32) { const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr; DWORD i; subnet = constraint->pbData; mask = constraint->pbData + 16; addr = name->pbData; match = TRUE; for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++) if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i])) match = FALSE; } /* else: name is wrong size, no match */ return match; } static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint, const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name) { CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName; DWORD size; BOOL match = FALSE; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData, constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size)) { DWORD i; match = TRUE; for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++) match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING, CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG, (CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]); LocalFree(constraintName); } return match; } static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name, const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present) { BOOL match = FALSE; if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice) { if (present) *present = TRUE; switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice) { case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL, name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL, name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL, name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress, &name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, &name->u.DirectoryName); break; default: ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n", constraint->dwAltNameChoice); *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; } } else if (present) *present = FALSE; return match; } static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name, const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { DWORD i; BOOL match = FALSE; for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++) match = alt_name_matches(name, &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL); return match; } static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name, const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present) { DWORD i; BOOL match = FALSE; for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++) match = alt_name_matches(name, &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, present); return match; } static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert) { PCERT_EXTENSION ext; ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2, cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension); if (!ext) ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension); return ext; } static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt, const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName; DWORD size; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME, altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &subjectAltName, &size)) { DWORD i; for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++) { BOOL nameFormPresent; /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present. * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate, * the certificate is acceptable." */ if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name( &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints, trustErrorStatus)) { TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n", subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice); *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; } nameFormPresent = FALSE; if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name( &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints, trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent) { TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n", subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice); *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; } } LocalFree(subjectAltName); } else *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS; } static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr, const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { DWORD i; BOOL match = FALSE; for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++) { const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint = &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base; if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME) match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name, (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus); } return match; } static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr, const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present) { DWORD i; BOOL match = FALSE; for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++) { const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint = &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base; if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME) { *present = TRUE; match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name, (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus); } } return match; } static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints( const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName, const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { CERT_NAME_INFO *name; DWORD size; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME, subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size)) { DWORD i, j; for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++) for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++) if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId, szOID_RSA_emailAddr)) { BOOL nameFormPresent; /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is * present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate, * the certificate is acceptable." */ if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name( &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints, trustErrorStatus)) { TRACE_(chain)( "email address in subject name is excluded\n"); *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; } nameFormPresent = FALSE; if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name( &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints, trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent) { TRACE_(chain)( "email address in subject name is not permitted\n"); *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; } } LocalFree(name); } else *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS; } static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name) { BOOL empty; if (!name->cbData) empty = TRUE; else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0) { /* An empty sequence is also empty */ empty = TRUE; } else empty = FALSE; return empty; } static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName, const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE; DWORD i; /* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name * constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses. * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6: * "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is * embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress * attribute [RFC2985]." * If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately. */ for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++) if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME) hasEmailConstraint = TRUE; for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++) if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME) hasEmailConstraint = TRUE; if (hasEmailConstraint) compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints, trustErrorStatus); for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++) { CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint = &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base; if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME && directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName)) { TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n"); *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; } } /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present. * If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is * acceptable." * An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it. */ if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName)) { BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE; for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++) { CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint = &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base; if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME) { hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE; match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName); } } if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match) { TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n"); *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; } } } static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints( const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert, DWORD *trustErrorStatus) { CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert); if (ext) compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints, trustErrorStatus); /* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the * subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to * subject alternative names." */ compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints, trustErrorStatus); } /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */ static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert) { CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL; CERT_EXTENSION *ext; if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension))) { DWORD size; CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info, &size); } return info; } static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info) { DWORD i; BOOL ret = TRUE; /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the * excludedSubtrees MUST be present." */ if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree) { WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n"); ret = FALSE; } /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum. * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the * application MUST either process these fields or reject the * certificate." * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we * reject any name constraint that contains them. */ for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++) if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum || info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum) { TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n"); ret = FALSE; } for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++) if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum || info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum) { TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n"); ret = FALSE; } return ret; } static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain) { int i, j; /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280, * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate * in the chain, not just the end cert. * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated * them. * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name * constraints. */ for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--) { CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints; if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints( chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))) { if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints)) chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT; else { for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { DWORD errorStatus = 0; /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name * constraints checked unless they're the end cert. */ if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned( chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext)) { CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints, chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, &errorStatus); if (errorStatus) { chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= errorStatus; CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus); } else chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS; } } } LocalFree(nameConstraints); } } } /* Gets cert's policies info, if any. Free with LocalFree. */ static CERT_POLICIES_INFO *CRYPT_GetPolicies(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { PCERT_EXTENSION ext; CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies = NULL; ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); if (ext) { DWORD size; CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &policies, &size); } return policies; } static void CRYPT_CheckPolicies(CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies, CERT_INFO *cert, DWORD *errorStatus) { DWORD i; for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++) { /* For now, the only accepted policy identifier is the anyPolicy * identifier. * FIXME: the policy identifiers should be compared against the * cert's certificate policies extension, subject to the policy * mappings extension, and the policy constraints extension. * See RFC 5280, sections 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.11. */ if (strcmp(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier, szOID_ANY_CERT_POLICY)) { FIXME("unsupported policy %s\n", policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier); *errorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS; } } } static void CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain) { int i, j; for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--) { CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies; if ((policies = CRYPT_GetPolicies(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))) { for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { DWORD errorStatus = 0; CRYPT_CheckPolicies(policies, chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, &errorStatus); if (errorStatus) { chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= errorStatus; CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus); } } LocalFree(policies); } } } static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name) { DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name, CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0); LPWSTR str = NULL; if (len) { str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR)); if (str) cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name, CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len); } return str; } static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry) { LPWSTR str; switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice) { case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME: TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n", debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId)); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name)); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName)); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName); TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str)); CryptMemFree(str); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL)); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n", entry->u.IPAddress.cbData); break; case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n", debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID)); break; default: TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice); } } static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name; DWORD size; TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type); if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size)) { DWORD i; TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry); for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++) dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]); LocalFree(name); } } static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info; DWORD size = 0; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &info, &size)) { TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]); TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n", info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have"); TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint); LocalFree(info); } } static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints; DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO); if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, 0, NULL, &constraints, &size)) { TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n"); TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not"); TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n", constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have"); TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint); } } static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage; DWORD size = sizeof(usage); if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size)) { #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \ if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit) if (usage.cbData) { trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE); trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE); trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE); trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE); trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE); trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE); trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE); trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE); } #undef trace_usage_bit if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE) TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n"); } } static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree) { dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base); TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n", subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum); } static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints; DWORD size; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints, &size)) { DWORD i; TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n", nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree); for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++) dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]); TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n", nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree); for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++) dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]); LocalFree(nameConstraints); } } static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies; DWORD size; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &policies, &size)) { DWORD i, j; TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo); for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++) { TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n", debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier)); TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n", policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier); for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a( policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j]. pszPolicyQualifierId)); } LocalFree(policies); } } static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage; DWORD size; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size)) { DWORD i; TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier); for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]); LocalFree(usage); } } static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage; DWORD size = sizeof(usage); if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size)) { #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \ if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit) if (usage.cbData) { trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE); trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE); trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE); trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE); trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE); trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE); trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE); } #undef trace_cert_type_bit } } static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext) { TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId), ext->fCritical ? "" : "not "); if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME)) dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME)) dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)) dump_basic_constraints(ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE)) dump_key_usage(ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2)) dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2)) dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2)) dump_basic_constraints2(ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS)) dump_name_constraints(ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES)) dump_cert_policies(ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE)) dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext); else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE)) dump_netscape_cert_type(ext); } static LPCWSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time) { static WCHAR date[80]; WCHAR dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */ SYSTEMTIME sysTime; if (!time) return NULL; GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt, sizeof(dateFmt) / sizeof(dateFmt[0])); FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime); GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date, sizeof(date) / sizeof(date[0])); return date; } static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { LPWSTR name = NULL; DWORD len, i; TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion); len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0); name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR)); if (name) { CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len); TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name)); CryptMemFree(name); } len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL, NULL, 0); name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR)); if (name) { CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL, name, len); TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name)); CryptMemFree(name); } TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n", debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore)), debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter))); TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension); for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++) dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]); } static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index) { PCERT_EXTENSION ext; BOOL ret; BYTE usageBits = 0; ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); if (ext) { CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage; DWORD size = sizeof(usage); ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size); if (!ret) return FALSE; else if (usage.cbData > 2) { /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages. */ return FALSE; } else { /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the * key usage bits. */ usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1]; } } if (isCA) { if (!ext) { /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage) * here. Quoting the RFC: * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures * on other public key certificates or CRLs." * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive: * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs. * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs, * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next * certificate in the chain. */ if (isRoot) ret = TRUE; else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 || cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2) { PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CRYPT_FindCertInStore( engine->hWorld, cert); ret = localCert != NULL; CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert); } else ret = FALSE; if (!ret) WARN_(chain)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n"); } else { if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE)) { WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n"); ret = FALSE; } else ret = TRUE; } } else { if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE)) { WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n"); ret = FALSE; } else ret = TRUE; } return ret; } static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { BOOL ret = TRUE; DWORD i; for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++) { if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical) { LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId; if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)) ret = TRUE; else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2)) ret = TRUE; else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS)) ret = TRUE; else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE)) ret = TRUE; else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME)) ret = TRUE; else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2)) ret = TRUE; else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_CERT_POLICIES)) ret = TRUE; else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE)) ret = TRUE; else { FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n", debugstr_a(oid)); ret = FALSE; } } } return ret; } static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { BOOL ret = TRUE; /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */ switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion) { case CERT_V1: /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280, * section 4.1.2.8: * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1." */ if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData || cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData) ret = FALSE; /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9: * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)." */ if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension) ret = FALSE; break; case CERT_V2: /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9: * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)." */ if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension) ret = FALSE; break; case CERT_V3: /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */ break; default: WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion); ret = FALSE; } return ret; } static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time) { PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]; int i; BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE; CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 }; TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n", chain->cElement, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time))); for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--) { BOOL isRoot; if (TRACE_ON(chain)) dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext); if (i == chain->cElement - 1) isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned( chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext); else isRoot = FALSE; if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext)) { /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code. */ chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION; } if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0) chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID; if (i != 0) { /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */ if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING, CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext, CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL)) chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID; /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid. */ if (pathLengthConstraintViolated) chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot, &pathLengthConstraintViolated)) chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint && constraints.dwPathLenConstraint) { /* This one's valid - decrement max length */ constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--; } } else { /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */ if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints( chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE)) chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; } if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, isRoot, constraints.fCA, i)) chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE; if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain)) { /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long. */ pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE; chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; } /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */ if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported( chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext)) chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION; CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus); } CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain); CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(chain); if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext)) { rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED | CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER; CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement); } CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus); } static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject, PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer, DWORD *infoStatus) { PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL; PCERT_EXTENSION ext; DWORD size; *infoStatus = 0; if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension))) { CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info; BOOL ret; ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType, X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info, &size); if (ret) { CERT_ID id; if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData) { id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER; memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB)); memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber, &info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB)); issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, prevIssuer); if (issuer) { TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n"); *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER; } } else if (info->KeyId.cbData) { id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER; memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB)); issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, prevIssuer); if (issuer) { TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n"); *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER; } } LocalFree(info); } } else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2, subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension))) { CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info; BOOL ret; ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType, X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info, &size); if (ret) { CERT_ID id; if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry && info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData) { PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL; DWORD i; for (i = 0; !directoryName && i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++) if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME) directoryName = &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i]; if (directoryName) { id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER; memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB)); memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber, &info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB)); issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, prevIssuer); if (issuer) { TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n"); *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER; } } else FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n"); } else if (info->KeyId.cbData) { id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER; memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB)); issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, prevIssuer); if (issuer) { TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n"); *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER; } } LocalFree(info); } } else { issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME, &subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, prevIssuer); TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n"); *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER; } return issuer; } /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain, * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found. */ static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine, HCERTSTORE world, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain) { BOOL ret = TRUE; PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext; while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) && !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert)) { PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(world, cert, NULL, &chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus); if (issuer) { ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer, chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus); /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to * close the enumeration that found it */ CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer); cert = issuer; } else { TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n"); chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN; break; } } return ret; } static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine, HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain) { BOOL ret = FALSE; PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain; TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine, world, cert, pTime); chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN)); if (chain) { memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN)); chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN); ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0); if (ret) { ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, chain); if (ret) CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime); } if (!ret) { CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain); chain = NULL; } *ppChain = chain; } return ret; } static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore, PCertificateChain *ppChain) { PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine; PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL; HCERTSTORE world; BOOL ret; world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0, CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL); CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0); if (hAdditionalStore) CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0); /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't * supported yet. */ if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime, &simpleChain))) { PCertificateChain chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain)); if (chain) { chain->ref = 1; chain->world = world; chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT); chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus; chain->context.cChain = 1; chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN)); chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain; chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0; chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL; chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE; chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0; } else ret = FALSE; *ppChain = chain; } return ret; } /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */ static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement( const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement) { PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN)); if (copy) { memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN)); copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN); copy->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT)); if (copy->rgpElement) { DWORD i; BOOL ret = TRUE; memset(copy->rgpElement, 0, (iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT)); for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++) { PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT)); if (element) { *element = *chain->rgpElement[i]; element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext( chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext); /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get * rechecked after the new chain is done. */ memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS)); copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element; } else ret = FALSE; } if (!ret) { for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++) CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]); CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement); CryptMemFree(copy); copy = NULL; } } else { CryptMemFree(copy); copy = NULL; } } return copy; } static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain) { DWORD i; for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++) CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]); CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext); chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0; chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL; } static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain) { DWORD i; CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain); for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++) CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]); CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain); CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0); CryptMemFree(chain); } /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of * simple chain iChain. */ static PCertificateChain CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain, DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement) { PCertificateChain copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain)); if (copy) { copy->ref = 1; copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world); copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT); /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get * rechecked after the new chain is done. */ memset(©->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS)); copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0; copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL; copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE; copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0; copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc( (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN)); if (copy->context.rgpChain) { BOOL ret = TRUE; DWORD i; memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0, (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN)); if (iChain) { for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++) { copy->context.rgpChain[i] = CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i], chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1); if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i]) ret = FALSE; } } else i = 0; if (ret) { copy->context.rgpChain[i] = CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i], iElement); if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i]) ret = FALSE; } if (!ret) { CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy); copy = NULL; } else copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1; } else { CryptMemFree(copy); copy = NULL; } } return copy; } static PCertificateChain CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain( HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore, PCertificateChain chain) { PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine; PCertificateChain alternate; TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain); /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent * order of alternate creation: */ if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext) chain = (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[ chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1]; /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */ if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1) alternate = NULL; else { DWORD i, j, infoStatus; PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL; alternate = NULL; for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++) for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer && j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++) { PCCERT_CONTEXT subject = chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext; PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext( chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext); alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer->hCertStore, subject, prevIssuer, &infoStatus); } if (alternateIssuer) { i--; j--; alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j); if (alternate) { BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus); /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it * to close the enumeration that found it */ CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer); if (ret) { ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world, alternate->context.rgpChain[i]); if (ret) CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime); CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus, &alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus); } if (!ret) { CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate); alternate = NULL; } } } } TRACE("%p\n", alternate); return alternate; } #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \ CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \ CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \ CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \ (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits) static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain) { DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST; if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus, CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)) quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT; if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus, CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)) quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus, CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN)) quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN; if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus, CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED)) quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID; if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus, CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)) quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID; return quality; } /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality" * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other * chains as lower quality chains of it. */ static PCertificateChain CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain( PCertificateChain chain) { DWORD i; /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the * lower quality contexts. */ for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++) { PCertificateChain alternate = (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]; if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain)) { alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext; alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] = (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain; chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0; chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL; chain = alternate; } } return chain; } static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain, const CertificateChain *alternate) { BOOL ret; if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext) chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext, (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) * sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)); else chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)); if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext) { chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[ chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] = (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate; ret = TRUE; } else ret = FALSE; return ret; } static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain( const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i) { DWORD j, iElement; PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL; for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++) { if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i) iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement; else element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement]; } return element; } typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS { DWORD cbSize; CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage; } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS; static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, LPFILETIME pTime, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags) { DWORD cContext; if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT) cContext = 1; else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) || (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT)) { DWORD i; for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++) { if (i < chain->cChain - 1 || chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; else cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; } } else cContext = 0; if (cContext) { PCCERT_CONTEXT *contexts = CryptMemAlloc(cContext * sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT)); if (contexts) { DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags; CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 }; CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus = { sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 }; BOOL ret; for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain; i++) { for (j = 0; iContext < cContext && j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++) contexts[iContext++] = chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext; } revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG; if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY) revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION; if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT) revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG; revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime; if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA)) { revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout; revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime = pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime; revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime = pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime; } ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING, CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, cContext, (void **)contexts, revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus); if (!ret) { PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain, revocationStatus.dwIndex); DWORD error; switch (revocationStatus.dwError) { case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK: case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL: case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE: /* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed to be * offline too. */ error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN | CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION; break; case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION; break; case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED; break; default: WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError); error = 0; } if (element) { /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */ element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error; } chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error; } CryptMemFree(contexts); } } } static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara) { if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS) && pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier) { PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert; PCERT_EXTENSION ext; BOOL validForUsage; /* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */ endCert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext; /* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's * public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12: * "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the * certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the * basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension." * If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage * if that usage is included in the extension: * "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used * for one of the purposes indicated." * There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't * have to be respected: * "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose * MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID * but not the particular OID expected for the application." * For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of * the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID. */ if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, endCert->pCertInfo->cExtension, endCert->pCertInfo->rgExtension))) { const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *requestedUsage = &pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage; CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage; DWORD size; if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size)) { if (pChainPara->RequestedUsage.dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND) { DWORD i, j; /* For AND matches, all usages must be present */ validForUsage = TRUE; for (i = 0; validForUsage && i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++) { BOOL match = FALSE; for (j = 0; !match && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++) match = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j], requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]); if (!match) validForUsage = FALSE; } } else { DWORD i, j; /* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */ validForUsage = FALSE; for (i = 0; !validForUsage && i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++) { for (j = 0; !validForUsage && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++) validForUsage = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j], requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]); } } LocalFree(usage); } else validForUsage = FALSE; } else { /* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid: * "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended * key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose * be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to * that application." * Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so * accept chains without it. */ TRACE_(chain)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n"); validForUsage = TRUE; } if (!validForUsage) { chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE; chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE; } } if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA) && pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier) FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n"); } static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch) { if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier) { DWORD i; TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name, usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR"); for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]); } } static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara) { TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize); if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS)) dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage); if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA)) { dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy", &pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy); TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout); TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime); TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime); } } BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore, PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext) { BOOL ret; PCertificateChain chain = NULL; TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext, pTime, hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags, pvReserved, ppChainContext); if (ppChainContext) *ppChainContext = NULL; if (!pChainPara) { SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG); return FALSE; } if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId) { SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA); return FALSE; } if (!hChainEngine) hChainEngine = CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(); if (TRACE_ON(chain)) dump_chain_para(pChainPara); /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */ ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine, pCertContext, pTime, hAdditionalStore, &chain); if (ret) { PCertificateChain alternate = NULL; PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain; do { alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine, pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain); /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation. * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end. */ if (alternate) ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate); } while (ret && alternate); chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain); if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS)) CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain); pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain; if (!pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus) CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, pChainPara, dwFlags); CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain, pChainPara); TRACE_(chain)("error status: %08x\n", pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus); if (ppChainContext) *ppChainContext = pChain; else CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain); } TRACE("returning %d\n", ret); return ret; } PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain( PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext) { PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext; TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext); if (chain) InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref); return pChainContext; } VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext) { PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext; TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext); if (chain) { if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0) CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain); } } static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error, LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement) { DWORD i, j; for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++) for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++) if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & error) { *iChain = i; *iElement = j; return; } } static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus) { pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1; if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); } else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); } else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */ pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1; } else pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR; return TRUE; } static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = { 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9, 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7, 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f, 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10, 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 }; static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = { 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5, 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8, 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6, 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18, 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 }; static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus) { BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus); if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT) { CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } }; BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE; PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert = pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]-> rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext; DWORD i; CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = { { sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 }, { sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 }, }; /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */ for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]); i++) { msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData; msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData; if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo( X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, &failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey)) isMSTestRoot = TRUE; } if (isMSTestRoot) pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT; } return ret; } static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus) { pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1; if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); } else pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR; return TRUE; } static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(PCERT_EXTENSION ext, LPCWSTR server_name) { BOOL matches = FALSE; CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName; DWORD size; TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name)); /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL. */ if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &subjectName, &size)) { DWORD i; /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist, * in section 4.2.1.6: * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form, * MAY be included." * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches. */ for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++) { if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME) { TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w( subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName)); if (!strcmpiW(server_name, subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName)) matches = TRUE; } } LocalFree(subjectName); } return matches; } static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(CERT_NAME_INFO *name, LPCWSTR component) { BOOL matches = FALSE; DWORD i, j; for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++) for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++) if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId)) { PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr; attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j]; /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component * must match one domain component attribute's entire string * value with a case-insensitive match. */ matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR)); } return matches; } static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len, LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards, BOOL *see_wildcard) { LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr; BOOL matches = TRUE; *see_wildcard = FALSE; if (server_len < allowed_len) { WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n", debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len), debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len)); /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match. */ return FALSE; } for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component; matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len; allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++) { if (*allowed_ptr == '*') { if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1) { WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n"); matches = FALSE; } else if (!allow_wildcards) { WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n"); matches = FALSE; } else { /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of * the component also matches. */ *see_wildcard = TRUE; break; } } matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr); } if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len) { /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component, * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'. */ matches = *allowed_ptr == '*'; } return matches; } static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, PCERT_RDN_ATTR nameAttr) { LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData; LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed; DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR); LPCWSTR server_component = server_name; DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name); BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE; TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len)); /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1: * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g., * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com * but not bar.com." * * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4: * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com, * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com." * * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g. * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com. */ do { LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot; allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.', allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed)); server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.', server_len - (server_component - server_name)); /* The number of components must match */ if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot)) { if (!allowed_dot) WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len)); else WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len)); matches = FALSE; } else { LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end; BOOL has_wildcard; allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len; server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len; matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component, allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component, server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard); /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components * may follow */ if (!has_wildcard) allow_wildcards = FALSE; if (matches) { allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end; server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end; } } } while (matches && allowed_component && allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len && server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len); TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches); return matches; } static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name) { BOOL matches = FALSE; CERT_NAME_INFO *name; DWORD size; TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name)); if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size)) { /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components, * make sure all of them are present. */ if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name)) { LPCWSTR ptr = server_name; matches = TRUE; do { LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end; /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */ WCHAR component[255]; DWORD len; end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr); len = end - ptr; if (len >= sizeof(component) / sizeof(component[0])) { WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n", debugstr_wn(ptr, len)); matches = FALSE; } else { memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR)); component[len] = 0; matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component); } ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end; } while (matches && ptr && *ptr); } else { PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr; /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make * make sure the common name matches. */ if ((attr = CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME, name))) matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr); } LocalFree(name); } return matches; } static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus) { pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1; if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); } else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); } else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */ pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1; } else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED; find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex); } else pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR; /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate * matches if the chain is otherwise okay. */ if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara && pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA)) { HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara; if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData)) { if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER && sslPara->pwszServerName) { PCCERT_CONTEXT cert; PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt; BOOL matches; cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext; altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo); /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6: * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the * domainComponent attribute." */ if (altNameExt) matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt, sslPara->pwszServerName); else matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert, sslPara->pwszServerName); if (!matches) { pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH; pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0; pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0; } } } } return TRUE; } static BYTE msPubKey1[] = { 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e, 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d, 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29, 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16, 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60, 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5, 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d, 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61, 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e, 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94, 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb, 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a, 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d, 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb, 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08, 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43, 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf, 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 }; static BYTE msPubKey2[] = { 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6, 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25, 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2, 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54, 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62, 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a, 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7, 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84, 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9, 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91, 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52, 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80, 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18, 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07, 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef, 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0, 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30, 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 }; static BYTE msPubKey3[] = { 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4, 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7, 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94, 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04, 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d, 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09, 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae, 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7, 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f, 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94, 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d, 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05, 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e, 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d, 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b, 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67, 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08, 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5, 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64, 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38, 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0, 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9, 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28, 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc, 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45, 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde, 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04, 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89, 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11, 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32, 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40, 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41, 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1, 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5, 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00, 0x01 }; static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus) { BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus); if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError) { CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } }; BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE; DWORD i; CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = { { sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 }, { sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 }, { sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 }, }; PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain = pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ]; PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext; for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]); i++) { msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData; msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData; if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo( X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, &root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey)) isMSRoot = TRUE; } if (isMSRoot) pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0; } return ret; } typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus); BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus) { static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL; BOOL ret = FALSE; CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL; HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL; TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext, pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus); if (IS_INTOID(szPolicyOID)) { switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID)) { case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE): verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy; break; case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE): verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy; break; case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL): verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy; break; case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS): verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy; break; case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT): verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy; break; default: FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID)); } } if (!verifyPolicy) { if (!set) set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet( CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0); CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0, (void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc); } if (verifyPolicy) ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus); if (hFunc) CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0); TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError); return ret; }