crypt32: Remove an unnecessary test for the extended key usage extension in CA certificates.

This commit is contained in:
Juan Lang 2009-11-17 14:40:08 -08:00 committed by Alexandre Julliard
parent d6958d7660
commit 96073d5129
1 changed files with 0 additions and 57 deletions

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@ -1604,58 +1604,6 @@ static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
return ret;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
BOOL ret;
/* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12: "In general, this extension will only
* appear in end entity certificates." And, "If a certificate contains
* both a key usage extension and an extended key usage extension, then
* both extensions MUST be processed independently and the certificate MUST
* only be used for a purpose consistent with both extensions." This seems
* to imply that it should be checked if present, and ignored if not.
* Unfortunately some CAs, e.g. the Thawte SGC CA, don't include the code
* signing extended key usage, whereas they do include the keyCertSign
* key usage. Thus, when checking for a CA, we only require the
* code signing extended key usage if the extended key usage is critical.
*/
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
if (ext && ext->fCritical)
{
CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
DWORD size;
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size);
if (ret)
{
DWORD i;
/* Explicitly require the code signing extended key usage for a CA
* with an extended key usage extension. That is, don't assume
* a cert is allowed to be a CA if it specifies the
* anyExtendedKeyUsage usage oid. See again RFC 5280, section
* 4.2.1.12: "Applications that require the presence of a
* particular purpose MAY reject certificates that include the
* anyExtendedKeyUsage OID but not the particular OID expected for
* the application."
*/
ret = FALSE;
for (i = 0; !ret && i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
if (!strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i],
szOID_PKIX_KP_CODE_SIGNING))
ret = TRUE;
LocalFree(usage);
}
}
else
ret = TRUE;
return ret;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
BOOL ret = TRUE;
@ -1804,11 +1752,6 @@ static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
if (i != 0)
if (!CRYPT_ExtendedKeyUsageValidForCA(
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
{
/* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints